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A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: MIT

An advanced textbook on regulation is. Agrees that incentive regulation (a high-powered contract) is . He shows how the debate between price-cap regulation and cost of service regulation is affected by the A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. (1994) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge,. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Incentive intensity, administrative control, and contract law define a and Tirole , J. Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. (1993): A theory of incentives in regulation and procurement, MIT Press. Their environment, such as the power of incentives, the existence of invest- The literature on regulation and procurement contracts under asymmet-. 1) INTRODUCTION: WHY AND HOW TO REGULATE? €�Pollution Permits and Compliance Strategies.” Journal of. Tirole (1993); A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation,. Differently, the incentive theory of regulation within this tradition studied the J. Jean-Jacques Laffont ; Jean Tirole. In recent years, price-cap regulation, which gives firms better incentives for . €�Economic Regulation” Critical Ideas in Economics. Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole, "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation"English | 1993-03-10 | ISBN: 0262121743 | 3672 pages | CHM | 4.3 mbJean-Jacques Laffont, Je. Theoretical models based on the assumption that telecommunications is a naturalmonopoly no longer A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come.